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NOTES

WHAT SHOULD BE THE EXTENT OF DAMAGES IN
PENNSYLVANIA IN AN ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT BASED
ON THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL?
If Uncle promised Johnny $1000 to buy a car and Johnny was able to buy one
for $500 is Uncle liable for the balance? 1 What would the Pennsylvania courts
say? There is no doubt that had Johnny given some consideration to his uncle in
return for his uncle's promise and all the other elements were present to make a
binding contract Uncle would be liable for the balance. But what would be the
result in Pennsylvania had Johnny not given something bargained for and in exchange for Uncle's promise?
A requirement of the law for the formation of an informal contract is a legally
sufficient consideration. 2 Consideration has been defined as something bargained
for and given in exchange for a promise.3 Where no consideration is given for
a promise but the promisee relies on the promise to his detriment the doctrine of
promissory estoppel may be employed. The doctrine, as promulgated by the American Law Institute in the Restatement of Contracts, is recognized as law and is employed in Pennsylvania. 4 As found in Section 90 the necessary elements for its
application are:
(1) A promise is made which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee; and
(2) The promise does induce such action or forbearance; and
(3) An injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
Under these circumstances the promise "is binding". 5
The Restatement gives no indication to what extent the promise is binding.
The question arises whether Section 90 is to be interpreted as meaning that the
promise is to be treated in all respects as a contract or as meaning merely that it
will be enforced by restoration of the status quo ante.
Pennsylvania courts finding the elements needed to sustain the use of promissory estoppel have done so only in restoring the status quo6 or in matters of defence 7 Whether or not a party in an action of assumpsit based upon promissory
1

4 Proceedings A.L.l. 95-96, 98-99, 101-104 (1926).

2
3
4

Restatement, Contracts

§ 19(c)

(1932).

Restatement, Contracts § 75(1) (1932).
Berry v. Maguire, 162 Pa. Super. 67, 56 A.2d 282 (1948).

6 Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932).
6 Burridge v. Ace Storm Windows Co., 69 D & C 184 (1949). The plaintiff adapted his factory

to make windows for the defendant upon the defendant's oral promise to supply materials and to
repurchase the windows at a price to cover all of the plaintiff's cost plus a reasonable profit. Final
terms of the agreement were to be drawn up when the plaintiff adapted his factory. The defendant
refused to enter into the agreement as promised and the plaintiff recovered expenditures.
I Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 447, 196 At. 39 (1938). The defendant in a suit by the plaintiff
landlord successfully employed promissory estoppel in showing that in reliance on the plaintiff's
promise to release him from lease he moved and entered a new business.
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estoppel would recover the same extent of damages as if it were a breach of an
othodox contractual relationship is something on which there can only be speculation. This question has never been squarely presented before any Pennsylvania
court.
The case of Union Trust Co. v. Long 8 illustrates how close the Pennsylvania
courts have come to deciding this question. The plaintiff brought an action of
assumpsit suing for a balance on a collateral note. The defendant counterclaimed
for the difference between what the defendant said would have been received if
the plantiff had sold the note when he allegedly promised to sell it and what was
in fact received by the sale. Mr. Justice Linn, in an appeal by the defendant, hints,
after finding no consideration for the plaintiff's promise to sell the pledged seturity, that had the defendant averred some facts upon which the doctrine of
promissory estoppel could be employed, the defendant would have had a stronger
case. Had the defendant done so, then the question of the extent of liability in
promissory estoppel would have presented itself for the first time and while the
doctrine was still in its fetal stage. Another case which illustrates the nearness of
having this question decided was General Electric Co. v. N. K. Ovalle9 , in which
a set-off and counterclaim based upon promissory estoppel were not sustained thus
once more frustrating the answer to the question here propounded.
Arguments for and against a Full Measure of Damages
Before attempting to decide whether a party claiming a promissory estoppel
should be put in the same position he would have been in if the promise had been
fulfilled or simply put in the same position he was before the making of the
promise, the statement of the doctrine must be examined. Is there any hint in the
statement of the doctrine that can be used as a basis for a speculation? In simplified
form the doctrne says that relief is to be given to a party who has relied on a
promise to his detriment, even though that party has given no consideration for
that promise, if it would be an injustice not to enforce it. From this can we decide
the question of damages? Upon the closest scrutiny there is just one word that might
be an aid, the word "injustice". What about the word injustice? Does it necessarily
mean injustice to the promisee alone? Is it not an injustice to Uncle to force him
to pay the additional $500 on a gratuitous promise and allow Johnny a windfall
because he obtained a car for less than what Uncle promised to give him? 10 Are
the Pensylvania courts going to give a full measure of damages only when it seems
just? There is no other hint from the Restatement as to the answer. However, the
American Law Institute was told by Mr. Williston that, "Either the promise is
binding or it is not. If it is binding, it has to be enforced as made."'" In the hypothetical case between Uncle and Johnny, according to Mr. Williston, Johnny is
entitled to the balance of the money.
8 309 Pa. 470, 164 AtI. 346 (1932).
9 335 Pa. 439, 6 A.2d 835 (1939).
10 98 U. of Penn. L. Rev. 459, 487.
11 See n. 1, supra.
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From here we turn to the case law. Upon looking for precedent in point, there
is almost a complete dearth of authority. This can be partially explained by the fact
that the Restatement of Contracts, with its separation of "promissory" from
"equitable" estoppel, was not promulgated until 1932, so the courts, in recognizing
the principles behind the doctrine, have hidden them in some cases behind other
titles. 12
One of the few cases in point is Goodman v. Dicker.'" The defendants were
local distributors for a radio manufacturing company. They told the plaintiff, with
no consideration moving from the plaintiff, that he would be granted a franchise
to sell the radois of the manufacturing company. They also told the plaintiff an
initial delivery of thirty radios was on its way. The plaintiff, relying on the defendant's representations, made expenditures preparing for the sale of these radios
by hiring salesmen and soliciting orders. The trial court found for the plaintiff
on the basis of estoppel and gave damages for the amount spent in preparation of
the franchise and for loss of profits on the anticipated sale of the radios. The
appellate court, in discussing what transpired in the lower court said, "This court
h'eld that a contract had not been proven.' 1 4 The court then modified the judgment
of the lower court by eliminating the damages for loss of profits. The court said
that justice and fair dealing required that one who acts to his detriment on faith
of conduct of the kind revealed should be protected by estopping the party who
had brought about the situation from alleging anything in opposition to the natural
consequences of his own course of conduct. Although this is a 1948 case, it is interesting to note that the term "promissory 'estoppel" is not used nor is the Restatement of Contracts, referred to. It is also interesting to note that no reason is
given for not allowing a full measure of damages as would have been granted if
the plaintiff had given consideration for the defendant's representations. The
court merely concluded that, "the true measure of damage is the loss sustained by
expenditures made in reliance upon the assurance of a dealer franchise." It must
necessarily follow that in not allowing the plaintiff recovery for loss of profits,
the court thought it was not to be treated as a contract but rather was to be treated
as a quasi-contractual obligation.
In Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan,15 the plaintiff was a brewer and the
defendant a beer distributor. The plaintiff promised the defendant that he could
have the exclusive agency for distributing beer in a given territory for as long as
the defendant remained in the beer business and devoted his time and attention to
the agency. The plaintiff sued for amounts due for beer sold and the defendant
counterclaimed for breach of the agency contract seeking as damages sums ex12

Rickets v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365 (1898).

Here a promise was enforced as

there was a good faith reliance and a change in position. Thus there were present the elements
of equitable estoppel.
18 169 F.2d 684 (1948).
14 Emphasis added.
15 102 F.2d 425 (1939).
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pended on the agency and for loss of anticipated profits. The appellate court found
that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was void for lack of mutuality.
It recognized a rule that the agent induced by th-e appointment to incur expenses
may be compensated by the principal for those expenses, but it carried the extent
of damages no further. Here again a court is recognizing a quasi-contractual obligation. Having found the contract void they are willing to restore the agent to
the status quo.
So we have authority, limited in volume though it is, that the extent of damages is restitutional only, and not only is the quantum of authority limited but also
the fact that both cases hold there was no binding contract is a marked distinction
that can not be ignored.
L. L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, in The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damges,'6 take issue with Williston's views as to Section 90. They say to apply the
"normal" rule, as they refer to it, to promissory estoppel would be wrong, since
Section 90 concerns a "non-bargain" promise. They maintain that most of the
arguments which would necessitate protection of the expectation interest would
not include Section 90 due to its non-bargaining nature. They state, "We are acastomed to think of these non-bargain promises, where the promisee must show
reliance in order to recover, as anomalous, as not quite contracts in the full sense
of the term."
There is no case authority for giving a full measure of damages where a party
has relied on a gratuitous promise where all the requisites of promissory estoppel
are present except within the confines of non-commercial donative promises. This
particular type of case, it is felt, must be distinguished as it would seem to be no
true precedent for giving a full measure of damages in a typical commercial transaction, as in the Goodman case or Terre Haute case. One case of this type is a
Pennsylvania decision. 17 The defendant, upon the plaintiff's retirement from
active duty with the defendant company, promised him a pension of $100 a month
as long as he lived and preserved his present attitude of loyalty and was not employed in any competitive occupation. The defendant stopped sending checks to
the plaintiff after four years, and the plaintiff was successful in maintaining an
oction for breach of contract, the court finding that the plaintiff was entitled to
tne promise as made. In Rickets v. ScQthorn,18 a grandfather handed his granddaughter a note for $2000 saying, "I have fixed out something that you have not
got to work any more. None of my grandchildren work and you don't have to."
The grandfather did not ask his granddaughter to give up her employment, but
merely promis'ed that she would not have to work unless she wanted to. She stopped
working, relying upon getting the $2000. The court admitted there was no con-

16
17

18

46 Yale L.J. 52, 63-66.
Langer v. Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 Ad. 571 (1932).

See n. 12, supra.
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sideration but enforced the promise as made. In both these cases there was no attempt to restrict damages to present reliance on the promise. The reason seems to
be (and this is why it should not be authority that damages predicated on promissory estoppel are like orthodox contracts) that it would be impossible to estimate
the loss sustained on the promise.
What Should Pennsylvania Hold?
It is submitted that Pennsylvania should give a full measure of damages where
an action or a dtfense is successfully maintained upon the basis of promissory
estoppel.
First: The doctrine of promissory estoppel as promulgated by the Restatement
of Contracts, has been declared to be law in Pennsylvania. 19 Upon turning to that
law it will be observed that Section 90 comes under the main heading of "Informal
Contracts" and under the sub-heading of "Informal Contracts without Assent or
Consideration". There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the informal contracts
mentioned in Section 90 are not to be treated as orthodox contracts. In the two
leading cases 20 which allow the promisee to recover only "out of pocket" damages
it was mentioned that there was no contract or the contract was void, and yet the
courts did allow recovery limited as it was. Therefore, neither of these cases should
be authority to a Pennsylvania court which recognizes that there is a contract under
Section 90.
Second: Granted that Section 90 deems the promise a contract, then the reason for not giving a full measure of damages in this section should be the same as
in any other contract, and not simply because there is no consideration given. Williston says:
"It also seems to have been the theory upon which recovery was allowed in the early law of assumpsit that the damage was based on the
consideration given rather than on the value of defendant's promise. Such
a rule was material when assumpsit was regarded as in the nature of a tort
for deceit, and when, therefore it might well seem that the law should
put the plaintiff in as good a position as he was in before the contract
was entered into rather than in as good a position as he would have been
had the contract been carried out. For more than a century, however,
the distinction between the cause of action for deceit and that for breach
of contract has been clearly recognized, and it is not now desirable to turn
contract and obligations imback the clock and erase the line dividing
2
posed by law irrespective of agreement" '
Should the Pennsylvania courts say, "No consideration moved from this man,
so he deserves less compensation?" Not if they face the fact that there can be a
contract without consideration. As evidence that the Pennsylvania courts have al19
20
21

See n. 4, supra.
See n.'s 13 and 14, supra.

5 Williston, Contracts

§ 1338 (rev. ed. 1937).
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ready faced this fact, there are the charitable subscription cases 2 in which the
courts have enforced promises without consideration, the cases where promises
to pay debts which have been discharged in bankruptcy have been enforced by
the courts on the theory of moral obligation 23 and the cases where a married woman
makes a promise and then upon becoming a feme sole make a new promise, the
courts enforcing the new promise on the theory of moral consideration. 24
Third: The Restatement of Contracts in Sections 327-346, concern damages.
Nowhere does it appear in these sections that promissory estoppel is not as much
of a contract as any other contract. Section 329 states:
"Where a right of action for breach exists, compensatory damages
will be given for the net amount of the losses caused and gains prevented
by the defendant's breach, in excess of savings possible."
Comment a. thereto says that in awarding compensatory damages, the effort
is made to put the injured party in as good a position as that in which he would
have been put by full performance of the contract.2 5
McCormack says:
"An older doctrine that profits were not recoverable has given way to the
present view that lost profits may be allowed as damages if in contract cases they
were within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made .... The

rule of certainty is sometimes phrased as a requirement that the damages must not
be speculative or contingent. The test seems to be one of contemplation. ' 2 6
Section 90 says a promise is binding which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the promisee etc. Can it not be said, then, that loss of profit flows from a
substantial action or forbearance and is part and parcel of a substantial action or
forbearance, and that if the promisor reasonably contemplates a substantial action
or forbearance he should be liable for those lost profits?
James L. Jubelirer
Member of the Middler Class
22
23
24
25

Univ. of Pa. Trustees v. Coxe's Ex'rs, 277 Pa. 512, 121 At. 314 (1923).
Kravitz Adm's v. Povlotsky, 333 Pa. 75, 3 A.2d 922 (1938).
Vineland National Bank and Trust Co. v. Kotok, 129 Pa. Super. 309, 195 Atd. 750 (1937).
Accord: Uniform Sales Act, May 19, 1915 P. L. 543, § 67(3), 69 P.S. § 312 and Uniform

Commercial Code, April 6, 1953 P. L. 3, § 2-713(1), 12A P.S. § 2-713(1).

26

McCormack, Damages, p. 97.

